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India is a vibrant plural democracy. The Indian armed forces were 
inherited from the British on attaining independence. The Indian soldier 
who forms a part of the three Services has been involved in combat right 
from the formation of the nation, The Indian soldier has always followed 
the motto stated by Field Marshal Philip Chetwode which states that the 
honour, safety and welfare of the country comes first always, and every 
time, the honour, safety and welfare of the men you command comes 
next; and your own comforts come last, always and every time.1 Whatever 
be the situation, the soldiers of the three Services have placed service 
before self and served the nation, its elected representatives and the nation 
with humility, courage and fortitude. The soldiers have always risen to the 
occasion and enabled the nation to grow as the world’s biggest and most 
vibrant democracy. At the current juncture, the Indian armed forces are 
professional and can execute operations with military profession.
At the outset, it must be clarified that civilian control is thought to 
be necessary for effective democratic governance. It is the principle of 
civilian control that differentiates democracies from authoritarian states. 
The military performs the dual role of making policy and fighting wars in 
authoritarian states. However, in democracies, there is a clear demarcation 
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of civilian and military roles and functions.2
A large amount of literature exists on the subject but very little 
work that has been done on the changing balance between civil-military 
relations over time.3 Stephen Cohen’s analysis in his book on the 
Indian Army explains why India’s political establishment has never been 
challenged by the military, while neighbouring countries like Pakistan 
have frequently been under military rule.4 This was due to the Indian 
Army’s high degree of professionalism which, as per the author, was due 
to years of indoctrination, selection and training. Further, civilians in 
India strengthened their own positions through the use of the Indian 
Constitution and high levels of party control. The mechanisms used by 
civilians to exercise tight control over the military as well as the training 
imparted to the military made the military completely subordinate to 
them. Of course, post 1960, there has been issues when both sides have 
politely expressed their points of view.5
Military Professionalism, Expertise and Core Issues in the 
Civil-Military Divide 
In a democracy where civilian control exists, there can be two kinds 
of relationship between the civil authority and the military. In the first 
case, there is a clear division where the military understands the civilian 
authority over decision-making and the civilian authority understands the 
military’s autonomy in its own sphere of functioning. The second could be 
where the division is blurred and there is a marked absence of agreement 
between civilians and the military on the precise nature of their functions. 
Samuel Huntington has addressed these issues objectively. He focusses 
on two issues: military professionalism and expertise, whereas another 
writer, Peter Feaver, focusses on the issue of military disobedience.6 
Civilian control, as per Huntington exists when there is a subordination 
of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.7 His definition 
implies two issues: the first is that civilians make policy and all policies 
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are implemented by other institutions that remain subordinate to civilian 
policies. The second aspect pertains to the armed forces, in which even if 
civilians respect the military as an autonomous institution with expertise 
on issues of strategy, the final decision on military strategy remains the 
prerogative of the civilians.8
 It is also stated there are two types of civilian control: objective 
control and subjective control. Objective control exists where there is a 
clear separation between civilian and military functions. On the contrary, 
in subjective control, civilians feel the necessity of exercising greater 
control over military affairs or the military influence on civilian policy 
formulation. The next question is: what is military professionalism? 
Huntington argues that the degree of professionalism exercised by any 
military is determined by its function of being a war-fighting force and 
nothing more. Once the military begins to take on different roles such as 
aiding civilians in military operations or maintaining law and order, then it 
begins to gradually lose its professional character as its employment takes 
it beyond strategy and fighting wars. In our case, the Indian armed forces 
are committed on counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K) as also in the northeastern states. Further, a numerous occasions, 
the armed forces have been called to maintain law and order as also for 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Consequently, the 
Indian government policy is influenced by the military’s decision in such 
matters.
As regards military expertise, it pertains to the ability of the military to 
execute its tasks with military precision without civilian interference. Prior 
to the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the strategic and tactical interference by 
the Defence Minister was used to exercise tight control over the armed 
forces. To signal their dissatisfaction, numerous issues were raised during 
that period.9 The end of the war saw the emergence of a new dynamics 
in the civil-military relationship. The next war took place with Pakistan 
in 1965 and the political leadership led by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur 
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Shastri ceded most of the decision-making to the military.10 The victories 
in 1965 and 1971 as also the Kargil conflict of 1999 witnessed greater 
military expertise being ceded by the civilian authority. The surgical strikes 
launched against Pakistan in 2016, as also the 73-days standoff against 
China in Doklam saw greater synergy between the civil and military in the 
field of military operations.
India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Need for Military 
Representation in Decision-Making
Post independence, Lord Ismay, Secretary of the Defence Committee of 
the British Cabinet and Chief of Staff to Winston Churchill was asked for 
his suggestions on setting up a structure for India’s defence organisation. 
Based on the experiences gained during partition, he formed separate 
committees for the civil and military.11 The final stage of evolution of the 
higher defence organisation occurred as a result of the nuclear tests in 
1998 and the Kargil Review Committee set up after the India-Pakistan 
Kargil conflict in 1999. The Kargil Review Committee was followed by 
the Group of Ministers (GoM) which made several recommendations 
regarding the higher defence organisation. A large number of them 
have been implemented. The Strategic Forces Command, comprising 
the Strategic Forces has been formed and is functional. In terms of 
appointments related to security, the National Security Adviser (NSA) has 
been appointed. Apart from the National Security Council, the National 
Security Council Secretariat, National Technical Research Organisation, 
Strategic Policy Group, National Information Board, National Security 
Advisory Board and the latest Defence Planning Committee have been 
constituted. All these, except the Defence Planning Committee, formed 
in April 2018, mainly comprise civilian officials. The military has very few 
officials in these committees.12 All these organisations are subordinate to 
the supreme body which is the Cabinet Committee on Security which 
comprises the Prime Minister, Home Minister, External Affairs Minister, 
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Finance Minister and Defence Minister. This is the supreme body and has 
no military representation. 
The Group of Ministers set up in April 2000 to examine the 
recommendations of the Review Committee insisted that a Chief of 
Defence Staff (CDS) be appointed who would be the single point adviser 
to the government on all military matters. The issue is still hanging 
fire and can only be resolved by a political decision. In the interim, 
to ensure a higher degree of jointness amongst the Services and to 
attempt inter-Service and intra-Service prioritisation, the government 
set up the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS), headed by 
the Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee 
(CISC) to support the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chairman. 
There a definite need of the CDS for undertaking joint operations as 
also to advise the Ministry of Defence on issues pertaining to defence. 
At present, the Ministry of Defence is at best moderating issues and 
there is need for greater integration and jointness.
Nuclear Command and Control System: Need for Intense 
Civil-Military Cooperation
India and Pakistan conducted the nuclear tests in 1998 and became de 
facto nuclear powers. The Kargil conflict was a limited one as the political 
leadership in India did not wish to enlarge the conflict as both countries 
had nuclear weapons. This led to limited use of air power, as this would 
need a wider area for effective operations. Post the terrorist attack on 
the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the Indian Army was ready to 
launch operations. This was termed as Operation Parakram. The Army 
stated that significant gains would have been made had the offensive been 
launched under political directions in January 2002. The military felt 
that they missed an opportunity. The political clearance not forthcoming, 
Pakistan improved its posture, reducing the chances by March 2002.13 
The political leadership had to adjust to these issues and from the lessons 
P K CHAKRAVORTY
CLAWS Journal z Winter 2018 39
learnt, the Nuclear Command Authority was set up in 2003. The nuclear 
arsenal is controlled by the Nuclear Command Authority which consists 
of the Executive Council headed by the NSA and the Political Council 
headed by the Prime Minister.14
India had faced the command and control dilemma ever since the 
tests were conducted in 1998. Accordingly, a Draft Nuclear Doctrine 
was prepared which was accepted by the Cabinet Committee Security 
(CCS) on January 04, 2003.15 The Indian nuclear chain of command is 
tabulated below in Figs 1 and 2. 
Fig 1: The Leadership Structure of the  




Prime Minister National Security Adviser Chairman Chief of Staff 
Committee, in future 
CDS
Home Minister Cabinet Secretary and 
Home Secretary
Chiefs of Army, Navy 
and Air Force
Defence Minister Defence Secretary C-in-C Strategic Forces 
Command
External Affairs Minister Foreign Secretary
Finance Minister Finance Secretary
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT
40  CLAWS Journal z Winter 2018
Fig 2
Source: Rakesh Kumar (2006).16
As cited above, Figs 1 and 2 clearly bring out the civil, bureaucratic 
and military leadership. Both these figures lucidly bring out the intense 
cooperation needed to be undertaken in a scenario of No First Use 
(NFU) and demated warheads with Permissive Action Launch (PAL).17 
According to Lt Gen Pran Pahwa, such precise issues would need 
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immense coordination and rehearsals between all members.18 The next 
aspect which needs attention is an optimum defence budget.
Optimisation of Defence Budget
India’s current defence budget is Rs 2, 95,511 crore which works out to 
just about 1.5 per cent of the projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
for 2018-19. Military experts contend that to meet the modernisation 
requirements, it should be over 2.5 per cent.19 In its 41st report to 
Parliament, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence headed 
by the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) Maj Gen B C Khanduri explicitly 
stated that the capital allocations for modernisation of Rs. 21,338 crore 
will have an adverse impact on its combat capability. The Army has to 
slash at least 25 of the 125 ‘Make’ projects. Similar is the case with the 
Navy and Air Force.20 All three Services are undertaking transformation 
to reduce the revenue component of the budget to ensure that the impact 
on capital procurement is reduced. To face a two-front war, a professional 
armed force needs to modernise and be capable, for which the civilian set-
up must provide the funding. This is an important aspect of civil-military 
relations which needs immediate attention. The civil administration in 
our set-up, while catering for other sectors of the economy, must look 
at the security interests. This would be possible when the country has a 
National Security Strategy and a Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan 
(LTIPP) approved by the CCS. The Finance Ministry has stated that 
funds have been allotted for improving connectivity to the border areas. 
This could be done, keeping modernisation plans under consideration. 
Certainly, the civil government needs to be sounded on the strategic 
interests of the military. This would keep relations between the two on 
an even keel.
Other Aspects
There are many other aspects which are impacting civil-military relations 
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currently. In the present dispensation, many of the shortcomings in 
India’s national security framework can be attributed to the civil-military 
relationship which has not grown and matured to keep pace with the 
modern-day security challenges. A certain degree of uneasiness between 
the civil and military is inevitable, and exists practically in all countries. 
The bureaucracy in India has placed the military firmly in a cage, leaving 
the latter to fret, fume and flutter against the bars of the cage. This has 
caused unevenness in military decision-making which certainly does not 
serve national interests.21 The politicians must be educated on military 
matters in the Indian context. A short capsule could be run for members 
of the executive and Members of Parliament (MPs) as also bureaucrats of 
the Ministry of Defence on military strategy at the Institute of Defence 
Studies and Analyses (IDSA) to educate civilians on military affairs. 
Another issue which has cropped up recently is protection to the 
soldier while undertaking duties pertaining to counter-insurgency in the 
northeastern states and J&K. The armed forces are called in when the 
police and other civilian agencies have failed. They are operating in areas 
which are covered by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. If the actions 
undertaken by them need to be questioned, it is done after obtaining 
permission from the central government. However, recently the orders 
passed by the courts run contrary to this, resulting in investigations under 
the civil criminal law. Accordingly, 356 personnel have represented before 
the Supreme Court. Their representation before the court, “A situation of 
confusion has arisen with respect to their protection from prosecution...
while undertaking operations in... proxy war, insurgency, ambushes and 
covert operations is justified”.22 Their petition pertinently asks “whether 
they should continue to engage in counter-insurgency operations as per 
military orders or act and operate as per the yardsticks of the Criminal 
Procedure Code”.23 The issue is under judicial consideration and there is 
no doubt that the issue would be resolved. The point to be noted is that 
the military soldier must be protected by the civilian government.
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Important Issues
Civil-military relations are extremely important for national security. 
Issues which need attention are as under:
  In a democracy, national security is of utmost importance. For civil-
military relations to be on an even keel, a National Security Strategy 
is needed, which clearly outlines the ends and means for harmonious 
civil-military relations. The government must leave no stone unturned 
to introduce this document at the earliest. A draft of the document 
has been placed by the National Security Advisory Board on more 
than one occasion to former Prime Ministers but has not yet seen the 
light of the day. The document needs to be revised once in two years 
due to the change in dynamics.
  The need for an LTIPP which flows out from the National Security 
Strategy must be approved by the CCS. This would lead to the 
provision of adequate funds and a planned modernisation of our 
armed forces. There would be no adhoc measures to modernisation 
and the armed forces would be able to undertake their tasks with 
alacrity and military precision.
  The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) must be appointed by the 
government. Guarding of turf is inimical to national interests and the 
time has come for the government to undertake this change. This 
would synergise all the agencies involved with security.
  India is a nuclear weapon state and has a Nuclear Command Authority. 
There is a mix of civilians and military officials in the apex body. 
Our weapons are in a demated state, and the actions commence only 
after a nuclear attack due to the ‘NFU’ policy. There is a need for 
cooperation, a high degree of coordination and rehearsals to ensure 
precise actions at all level.
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  The Army belongs to the nation. The nation must protect the soldier 
in sensitive situations, particularly during domestic utilisation.
  A capsule must be run at the IDSA for bureaucrats and MPs to 
educate them on strategy and military affairs.
  The armed forces must do their utmost to make civilians understand 
their methods and procedures by greater interaction at all levels. 
They must be given due respect, and cooperation must be effected 
at all levels, from top to bottom. There must be a total synergy for 
ensuring national security.
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